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Professional Associations
I
THE OHIO PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION LAW
William J. Vesely
INTRODUCTION
For perhaps a decade or more the Congress of the United States has
had presented to it a series of bills, the purpose of which has been to
extend to self-employed individuals, including professional men, tax bene-
fits corresponding to the benefits enjoyed by employees under the quali-
fied pension, profit sharing, and annuity plan provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.1 These legislative proposals have been singularly un-
successful. The most recent proposal2 became so watered down with
amendments designed to meet objections of the Treasury Department
that there is serious doubt as to whether the restricted benefits it would
provide justify the intensive legislative activity expended in its behalf. In
these circumstances aggrieved taxpayers quite naturally looked for other
means to meet the problem. The Kintner case,8 and similar cases,' demon-
strate the solution arrived at by some more audacious groups of tax-
payers. At one time it was thought that these cases might provide the
necessary authority for permitting associations of professionals to be taxed
as corporations, and for professional men to qualify as employees of
corporations for tax purposes. With the promulgation on November
15, 1960, of Treasury Decision 6503, the so-called Kintner Regulations,5
however, it was made dear that insofar as the Treasury Department is
concerned, it is virtually impossible, at least in states which have adopted
the Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
to form a partnership or other unincorporated association which will
qualify as an "association" for tax purposes. To overcome this new
hurdle, or perhaps in order to avoid entirely the obstades posed by the
Regulations, the legislatures of many states have enacted professional
association or professional corporation laws. The sole purpose of these
laws is to permit professional men to organize and carry on their profes-
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-04 [hereinafter cited as CODE f].
2. HR. 10, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (Jenkins-Keough Bill).
3. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
4. E.g., Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
5. 1960-2 CuM. BULL 409; Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-11 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Reg. 53.
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sional practice as a corporation, or by means of a legal entity, whether
or not called a corporation, which possesses the characteristics required
for classification as an "association" under the Regulations, and thus is
treated as a corporation for tax purposes. At the present time laws of
this kind are in effect in fourteen states.' A number of other states' have
considered legislation of this character but have not yet taken any action.
The laws which have been enacted to date can be grouped into two
broad categories: (1) laws which are self-contained in the sense that
they provide how the entity is to be organized, its shares issued, directors
or managers selected and the like, without reference to the general corpora-
tion law,' and (2) laws which are a part of, or incorporate by reference
the provisions of, the general corporation law.9 The Ohio law is in the
second group. There is a surprising variation in the provisions of the
laws of the different states, although a basic pattern exists." As a general
observation it might be said that the Ohio law represents the most succinct
form of law, being in this respect like the laws of Illinois and Pennsyl-
vania. It is understood that it is the form of bill which was considered
but not acted upon by the legislature of the State of Indiana."
ESTABLISHING A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
UNDER THE NEW ACT
The Ohio law' 2 became effective on October 17, 1961. It consists
of some eight separate sections which appear as sections 1785.01 through
1785.08 of the Revised Code. It provides for the creation of a new kind
of corporate creature authorized to perform specifically designated pro-
6. Alabama, H. 138, Act No. 865, approved and effective Sept. 8, 1961, CCH 1961 STAND.
FED. TAx REP. 5 6526; Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-1701-1717 and 1801-1817 (Supp.
1961); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. [Public Act No. 158] (Supp. 1961); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. [ch. 61-64] (Supp. 1961); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-4301-4318
(Supp. 1961); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106V2, §§ 101-109 (Supp. 1961); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §5 319.01-.23 (Supp. 1961); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1785.01-.08
(Supp. 1961); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 801-819 (Supp. 1961); Pennsyl-
vania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 197-1-19 (Supp. 1961); South Dakota, S.D. CODE ch. 163
(Supp. 1961); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-05 (Supp. 1961); Texas, Tex. Laws 1961,
ch. 158, § 6(3); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180-99 (Supp. 1961).
7. California, Indiana, Iowa, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island.
8. E.g., Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 , 5§ 101-109 (Supp. 1961); Pennsylvania, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §5 197-1-19 (Supp. 1961).
9. E.g., Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 819 (Supp. 1961); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.99(3) (Supp. 1961).
10. The Connecticut Law, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. [Public Act No. 158] (Supp. 1961),
appears to be unique. It amended the Connecticut Uniform Partnership Law to authorize three
or more persons to form an association having at least three of the four significant corporate
characteristics required by the Regulations for classification as an association. The Texas law,
Tex. Laws 1961 ch. 158, § 6(3), also makes special provision for professional associations in
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act.
11. For a discussion of the Indiana bill see Lyon, Action in Indiana on Kintner-Type Organi-
zations, 39 TAxEs 266 (1961).
12. OHIO REV. CODE ch. 1785 (Supp. 1961).
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fessional services. "Professional service" is a term of art, defined by
reference to specific chapters of the Revised Code regulating the pro-
fessions to which the act relates."3 It includes, in addition to the more
generally recognized professions of law, medicine, dentistry, accounting,
engineering, and architecture, a number of "limited branches of medi-
cine or surgery. '  A professional association may perform only one
professional service. For example, engineers and architects would not
be permitted to organize a single professional association to practice both
professions.
Classification
The Ohio law uses the identifying term "professional association."' 5
The provisions of the law refer to the entity variously as a corporation
and as an association. The provisions of the general corporation law, to
the extent they do not conflict with the provisions of the new law, are
made applicable to professional associations.'" This is a strong indica-
tion that the new entity is, in fact, a corporation, despite the use of the
identifying term "professional association."
Corporate Authority
Although a professional association may perform only the profes-
sional service for which it is organized, it has the authority to exercise the
corporate powers and functions which every corporation may exercise
in carrying out its proper corporate purpose. Thus the professional
association may own the property it requires in order to perform pro-
fessional services. This would include real property and both tangible
and intangible personal property, provided such property is related to the
carrying on of the corporation's professional purpose." For example,
13. See OHIo REv. CODE § 1785.01(A) (Supp. 1961).
14. For example, Suggestive Therapy, Magnetic Healing, Swedish Massage, and others as de-
fined in section 4731.15 of the Revised Code are included.
15. The Ohio law, in this respect, is similar to the laws of Pennsylvania, (PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
14 § 197-1-19 (Supp. 1961), and of Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106V, §§ 101-09 (Supp.
1961), and different from the laws of some other states which classify the organization as a
"Professional Corporation," (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 801 (Supp. 1961)), or "Service
Corporation," (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.99(1) (Supp. 1961)).
16. Omio REV. CODB § 1785.08 (Supp. 1961).
17. The laws of a number of states (Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106V, 5 104 (Supp.
1961); Oklahoma, OKrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 806 (Supp. 1961); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.99(3) (Supp. 1961)) expressly authorize the professional association to invest
its funds in real and both tangible and intangible personal property. A provision of this kind
was dropped from the Ohio law during the legislative process. See Dunkel, Professional Cor-
porations, 22 OmIo ST. LJ. 703, 709 (1961). The general corporation law, however, ex-
pressly authorizes corporations to purchase, invest in, and hold property of any description, and
makes specific provision for investing funds in shares or other securities. See OIo REv.
CODE § 1701.13 (F) (6) (Supp. 1961). An Ohio professional association would have
this authority, although limited to its professional purpose.
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the corporation may wish to set aside funds for the purchase of new
equipment, or for the remodeling or expansion of its space and facilities.
Or it may wish to set aside funds as a reserve to fund an obligation to
redeem outstanding shares upon the retirement or death of a shareholder.
These purposes, and the investment of the funds set aside to accomplish
them, would properly be within the scope of the association's permitted
professional purpose."8
Organization
A professional association may be organized by'" and its shares issued
only 2 persons who are duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to
perform the same professional service as that for which the corporation
is organized. Presumably the techniques of incorporation will be those
used in organizing any business corporation.2 ' The Articles of Incorpora-
tion of the professional association are filed with the Secretary of State.'
An existing organization may amend its present agreement to the form
necessary to constitute its articles of incorporation and then file this docu-
ment.' The Secretary of State's office apparently will not, as a condition
of filing the articles, require that the incorporators be professionally
licensed persons.2 4 But in view of the express language of section
1785.02 providing for organization by professionally licensed individuals,
the better practice would be to use such professional persons as the in-
corporators. As with any corporation, a statutory agent will have to be
designated and the shares of the professional association will have to be
registered with the Division of Securities.25
18. For a discussion of this problem in relation to the accumulated earnings tax, see Alex-
ander, Some Tax Problems of a Professional Association, p. 219 infra.
19. OHIo REV. CODE § 1785.02 (Supp. 1961).
20. Omo REV. CODE § 1785.05 (Supp. 1961).
21. The Secretary of State has issued a useful Corporate Checklist, in pamphlet form, setting
forth the suggested procedures. If in view of the recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
in State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio Sr. 114 (1962) (see note 59 infra), the Rules of
Practice of the Supreme Court ultimately are amended to permit professional associations to
practice law, additional requirements may be imposed in the case of such professional associa-
tions.
22. OHIO REV. CODE § 1785.06 (Supp. 1961).
23. See OHIO REv. CODE § 1785.02 (Supp. 1961): "Any such group of individuals who
may be rendering a specific professional service as an organization created otherwise than pur-
suant to sections 1785.01 to 1785.08, inclusive, of the Revised Code may incorporate under
and pursuant to the provisions of this act by amending the agreement establishing the organi-
zation in such manner that such agreement as amended shall constitute articles of incorpora.
tion prepared and filed in the manner prescribed in section 1785.08 of the Revised Code and
by otherwise complying with the applicable requirements of sections 1785.01 to 1785.08,
inclusive, of the Revised Code."
24. See OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1701.04(A), 1785.08 (Supp. 1961). Section 1701.04(A)
requires only that incorporators be natural persons who are citizens of the United States. This
section is made applicable to the incorporation of a professional association by section 1785.08.
25. OHIo REV. CODE § 1785.08 (Supp. 1961).
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Corporate Name
There are no special statutory requirements concerning the corporate
name. The provision of the general corporation law requiring that the
name have a corporate ending " applies to professional associations' The
Secretary of State's office will require, as a condition to the filing of the
articles, that the name include the name of one or more of the share-
holders,28 or that the name be one that has been in use by the organization
prior to its incorporation, so as not to mislead.-' The Attorney General
has rendered an opinion ° that the words "engineer" or "engineering" may
not, in view of section 4733.16 of the Revised Code, be used in the name
of a professional association. A dentist may practice dentistry through a
professional association only if his name is included in the name of the
professional association.?1 Practice of the other professions is not subject
to any such statutory requirement and, in the case of a professional asso-
ciation of attorneys, there is precedent permitting the use of a firm name
which may include the names of only a few or none of the active at-
torneys.32
ISSUANCE, TRANSFER, AND REDEMPTION OF SHARES
IN A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
Shares may be issued only to persons licensed or otherwise legally
authorized to perform the same professional service as the professional
association and may be sold or transferred by a shareholder only to an-
other professionally qualified individual 38 Shareholders are not required
to participate as directors, officers, or employees of the professional asso-
ciation in which they hold shares, nor is a professionally qualified person
prohibited from holding shares in more than one professional association,
provided he is professionally qualified to practice the same profession as
each of the associations.3
The Ohio law does not attempt to deal with a multiplicity of prob-
26. Omo REV. CODE § 1701.04(A) (1) (Supp. 1961).
27. It is understood that this was not intended. The reference in section 1785.08 of the
Revised Code to the requirements of section 1701.06(A) instead of section 1701.04(A) (1)
apparently was inadvertent.
28. OHIo REv. CODE § 1785.06 (Supp. 1961). This practice is of doubtful validity. See
Dunkel, Professional Corporations, 22 OHIO ST. LJ. 703, 710 (1961) referring to proposed
section 1785.10, relative to the corporate name. It was not enacted into law.
29. See the Corporate Checklist, note 20 supra, issued by the Secretary of State.
30. No. 2531 Ops. Arr'i,. GEN. (Ohio 1961).
31. OnIo REV. CODE § 4715.18.
32. Canon 33 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics.
33. OHno REV. CODE §§ 1785.05-.07 (Supp. 1961).
34. However, dentists and dental surgeons are restricted by section 4715.18 of the Revised
Code to membership in professional associations having offices in which they actually practice
or in which they spend a majority of their time personally overseeing the work while the office
is in operation. See also OHIO REV. CODE 5 1785.01 (Supp. 1961).
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lems incident to the ownership and transfer of shares. The obvious situa-
tions where problems can arise are the death of a shareholder, professional
disqualification, and retirement from active participation in the associa-
tion. Many of the problems can be resolved by an agreement among the
shareholders, or by including in the articles of incorporation or the code
of regulations provisions for the purchase and sale, or other transfer of
the shares upon the occurrence of any of these events. The provisions
could be made self-executing thereby avoiding the problem of the status,
as well as the effect upon the professional association, of shares in the
hands of non-professionally qualified persons.
A major concern in providing for the purchase, sale, and transfer of
shares is the possible lack of authority of the professional association to
repurchase its own shares in view of the statutory provision that shares
may be "sold or transferred" only to professionally qualified individuals.
The authority for a corporation to purchase its own shares is found in
section 1701.35 of the Revised Code. A corporation also has authority
under section 1701.23 of the Revised Code to redeem its own shares.
Because of the express provision of the law restricting the sale or trans-
fer of shares to professionally qualified individuals, 5 and notwithstand-
ing the suggestion that a corporation's purchase of its own shares would
not be a sale or transfer within the meaning of the law, there is serious
doubt as to the authority of a professional association to purchase its shares
pursuant to section 1701.35.6
A redemption of its shares under section 1701.23, however, may be
permissible. In order to redeem its shares, the necessary terms and condi-
tions of the redemption must be set forth in the express terms of shares
contained in the articles of incorporation." The effect of such a redemp-
tion, unlike a purchase of shares under section 1701.35, would be to retire
the shares, restoring them to the status of authorized and unissued shares.
Of course, should the professional association proceed in accordance with
section 1701.35, as a practical matter the question of corporate authority
may never arise. The parties should recognize, however, that in the
event of some disagreement among them the aggrieved party would be
able to assert this defense.
Although no provision is made for the consequences of a purported
sale or transfer of shares to, or their acquisition by, unauthorized persons,
any attempt to make such a transfer would be ineffective in view of the
35. OHIO REV. CODE § 1785.05 (Supp. 1961).
36. The doubt is not resolved by resort to some inherent power of a corporation to purchase
its own shares in the absence of statutory authority, the situation which existed in Ohio prior
to the enactment in 1927 of section 8623-41 of the General Corporation Act. See 1 DAVIEs,
OHIO CoRPoRATrON LAW 703-05 (1942). The issue rather is the effect to be given to the
specific provision of the professional association law limiting sales and transfers to another
licensed "individual."
37. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1701.23 (B), 1701.04(A) (4) (Supp. 1961).
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provision limiting the transferees to professionally qualified persons.8
The law also makes no provision for the consequences of the death or dis-
qualification of a shareholder. In the absence of an agreement or re-
strictive provisions in the articles or regulations, presumably the shares of
a deceased shareholder would continue as issued and outstanding shares
in the hands of his executor or administrator. Does it follow that if
such person is not professionally qualified, the professional association
will be disqualified to perform professional services? Would this also be
the case if the shareholder were disqualified? In the present state of
the law there is no dear answer. It would seem that the lack of corporate
authority to continue as a professional association could be asserted only
in the manner, and by the persons designated in, section 1701.13 (H) of
the Revised Code.!9 This is a matter which will require corrective legisla-
tion,4" although in at least one state, Florida, the Attorney General pro-
vided an interesting solution."1
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
The professional association may render professional services only
through individuals licensed or otherwise legally authorized to perform
such services. = They need not be shareholders of the professional
association. The law recognizes that the association may employ non-
professional employees to perform services as clerks, bookkeepers,
technicians, and other services of a non-professional character.43 It also
apparently recognizes that non-professionally qualified employees may
perform, or assist in the performance of, professional services provided
38. OHIo REV. CODE § 1785.05 (Supp. 1961).
39. Section 1701.13(H) of the Revised Code provides: "No lack of or limitation upon,
the authority of a corporation shall be asserted in any action except (1) by the state in an
action by it against the corporation, (2) by or on behalf of the corporation against a director,
an officer, or any shareholder as such, (3) by a shareholder as such or by or on behalf of the
holders of shares of any class against the corporation, a director or an officer, or any share-
holder as such, or (4) in an action involving an alleged overissue of shares."
40. The professional association laws of several states have detailed provisions for the transfer
of shares in these circumstances. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 809 (Supp. 1961); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.99(10) (Supp. 1961).
41. An opinion of the Florida Attorney General (061-137, Sept. 12, 1961) states that
-where the owner dies the inheriting shareholders are permitted to amend the articles of the
professional service corporation to continue as a general corporation to conduct other business.
42. Section 1785.03 of the Revised Code provides: "A professional association may render
professional service only through officers, employees, and agents who are themselves duly
licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render professional service within the state. The
term 'employee' as used in this section does not include clerks, bookkeepers, technicians, or
other individuals who are not usually and ordinarily considered by custom and practice to be
rendering professional services for which a license or other legal authorization is required,
nor does the term 'employee' include any other person who performs all his employment under
the direct supervision and control of an officer, agent, or employee who is himself rendering
professional service to the public on behalf of the corporation."
43. Ibid.
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such services are performed under the direct supervision and control of a
qualified professional officer, agent or employee of the professional asso-
ciation.44 It is difficult to determine precisely the situation contemplated
by this latter provision, because of the express requirement that profes-
sional services be performed only through duly licensed or legally author-
ized officers, agents, and employees. Possibly it has reference to medical
and dental assistants, lab technicians, and other persons whose work might
be viewed as being more directly a part of the professional services which
the association performs, in contrast to the administrative work of secre-
taries, bookkeepers, and the like.
There is no statutory requirement, as there is in the laws of many
states,45 that the directors and officers be licensed professional persons.
Notwithstanding the absence of a statutory prohibition, it would not be
good practice to place non-professional men in responsible corporate
positions.46 The state licensing agencies supervising the practice of the
professions would seem to have, through their control over the licensed
individuals, the authority necessary to prohibit the practice of a profession
by a professional association having non-professional directors or officers.
Preservation of Professional Relationship
The professional association laws uniformly provide some modifica-
tion of the relationship that ordinarily exists between the officers and
employees of a corporation and the persons dealing with the corporation,
and of the legal consequences that attend such relationship. The Ohio
law accomplishes this by providing that it does not modify any law
affecting the legal relationship between the person who performs and
the person who receives professional service, including liability arising out
of such professional service.47 In the absence of this provision, the per-
son performing professional services, as would any employee, would be
personally liable for his wrongful acts. But an employee acting in behalf
of his employer ordinarily would have no contractual liability to third
persons, whereas the professional employee, by reason of this provision,
would have continuing personal liability for any obligations arising out
of his performance of professional services, whether in contract or tort.
Other important considerations undoubtedly are the preservation of the
attorney-client and physician-patient relationship, notwithstanding that
44. Ibid.
45. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 , § 101 (Supp. 1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 18, §
810 (Supp. 1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.99(6) (Supp. 1961).
46. The rule of practice proposed by the Colorado Bar Association to the Supreme Court of
Colorado deals with this problem by providing that lay directors and officers shall not exercise
any authority over professional matters. Hodges & Moses, Report of Special Committee of the
Colorado Bar Association to Consider the Desirability of Establishing Professional Service
Corporations for the Practice of Law (October 11, 1961).
47. OHIO REV. CODE § 1785.04 (Supp. 1961).
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in contemplation of law it is the professional association, and not its pro-
fessional employee, which renders the professional service.
Since the statute refers to the person who performs and the person
who receives professional service, apparently it does not affect the lia-
bility of the shareholders of a professional association in their capacity
as shareholders. As a matter of corporate law, therefore, shareholders
would have no liability as shareholders for corporate obligations. This
is the significant relationship in determining whether the professional
association satisfies the limited liability test of the Regulations.48 Under
the Ohio law, this test is met 49
The professional association laws of a number of states" preserve
the partnership rule of joint and several liability of all shareholders for
claims arising out of the performance of professional services, or for the
negligent or reckless conduct of any person, and limit the liability of
shareholders only in the case of contractual and other claims arising in
the ordinary course of business apart from the performance of professional
services. The policy embodied in these laws represents a broad rule of
professional responsibility, obligating each member of a group of profes-
sional associates to pledge his personal liability and resources to that
organization, and to the acts performed by any person in its behalf. Pre-
sumably the relationship of trust and confidence involved is thought to
require this broad professional responsibility. In view of the realities of
modern professional practice, this is questionable.51 In any case it seems
reasonably clear that the Ohio law follows the usual corporate rule of
limited shareholder liability.5"
48. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960).
49. A recent article, Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some
Comments and Questions, 17 TAx L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1961), suggests that the equivalent pro-
vision of the Georgia Act (Section 7, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-4301-4318) may preserve among
the members of the association the same mutual agency relationship which exists among part-
ners under the Uniform Partnership Act, thus destroying the characteristic of limited liability.
Since the Georgia Act, like the Ohio law, refers to the relationship between the person furnish-
ing and the person receiving professional service and not to the relationship between the mem-
bers or shareholders of the professional association and the person receiving professional
service, there is doubt that it has the broad effect suggested by Professor Bittker. This inter-
pretation seems even more doubtful under the provision of the Ohio law which does not, as
does section 7 of the Georgia Act, make any reference to the liability of shareholders of the
professional association in their capacity as shareholders.
50. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. [Public Act No. 158] (Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 197-17 (Supp. 1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 180.99(8) (Supp. 1961).
51. See Opinion 303 (1961), Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the
American Bar Association. This opinion holds that the restrictions on the personal liability
of other lawyers in the professional association must be made apparent to the client. The
rule proposed by the Colorado Bar Association (see note 46 supra) provides for professional
liability insurance determined under a formula as a substitute for unlimited personal liability.
52. The argument that the Ohio law does not have this effect probably would be that since
shareholders performing professional services for the association would not, because of the
intervention of the corporate entity, be liable for acts of other shareholders also performing
professional services for the association, the joint and several partnership liability rule which
1962]
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Special Ethical Problems of Attorneys
The organization of a professional association of attorneys raises cer-
tain questions which are unique to the practice of law.5" There are three
principal areas of concern: (1) unconstitutional interference with the
control of the judiciary over the practice of law, (2) unauthorized practice
of law by a lay agency, and (3) violations of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.
The Judicial Power and the Unauthorized Practice of Law
The Constitution of Ohio vests the judicial power in the judiciary"
and prohibits the General Assembly from exercising any judicial power
not expressly conferred upon it.5  These constitutional provisions obvi-
ously do not prohibit the General Assembly from passing laws establish-
ing courts, legal procedures, and other matters essential to the practice of
law. The power of the General Assembly to pass laws specifically gov-
erning the practice of law by attorneys, fixing qualifications for admission
to the bar, and establishing procedures for disbarment is well settled. "
Law partnerships in the state of Ohio are organized under and governed
by an act of the General Assembly, the Uniform Partnership Act. In
fact, until the enactment of the Professional Association Law the consti-
tutional power of the legislature to pass laws specifically governing the
practice of law, as well as general laws having application to the legal
profession as well as to other businesses, seemed to be unquestioned.
In a number of cases involving the unauthorized practice of law by
lay agencies, however, the courts have used broad language to the effect
that the legislature may not constitutionally authorize the practice of law
by corporations, and that the conditions for admission to the bar and com-
pliance with the rules of practice absolutely preclude a corporation from
practicing law.5" These statements were made in the context of a lay
agency engaging in the practice of law at a time when the statutes ex-
previously applied to the relationship between such individuals and their clients would be
modified. Therefore, section 1785.04 of the Revised Code which precludes modification of
an existing professional relationship would apply to preserve that relationship. The argument
requires a tortured construction of the statute and, in view of the direct way in which the per-
sonal liability of the associates, members, or shareholders has been preserved where that was
intended (e.g., Connecticut, CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. [ch. 61-641 (Supp. 1961); Pennsyl-
vania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 197-1-19 (Supp. 1961)) it is not persuasive.
53. The accountants have had a long standing rule barring corporate practice. Rule 11,
Rules of Professional Conduct, American Institute of Accountants, as revised December 19,
1950, C.P.A. HANDBOOK ch. 5, p. 6.
54. OHto CoNST. art. IV, §1.
55. OHio CoNsT. art. II, 5 32.
56. OHIo REV. CODE ch. 4705; In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419 (1956).
57. Judd v. City Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81 (1937). See also Steer v. Land Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 113 NXE.2d 763, 767 (Ohio C.P. 1953): "Any statute which would
attempt to sanction, or even hint at the propriety of, a corporation's practicing law would be
obviously invalid."
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pressly prohibited the practice of law by any corporation.5" It is doubtful
that they are properly applicable to a special form of organization, sub-
ject to rigid professional requirements and authorized to perform legal
services only through professionally qualified persons."9 Except for the
"intermediary" issue, hereinafter discussed, which is not a constitutional
issue, it is difficult to see any significant difference between the practice
of law by a professional association and by a law partnership0 The
important factor, common to both, is that the organization performing
legal services would be comprised of, and its services would be rendered
by, professionally qualified individuals. Such individuals, and through
them the professional association, necessarily would be subject to judicial
supervision and control.
The unauthorized practice issue is essentially a question of the practice
of law by a lay agency lacking the authority to do so. The professional
association, provided it complies with the rules of practice established
by the judiciary, will not be such an unauthorized lay agency.
The real concern in this area may be that the giving of legislative and
judicial sanction to the practice of law by a corporation, even a special
kind of corporation subject to quite restrictive rules, involves the serious
risk of opening the floodgates to the practice of law by unauthorized
persons. This could be an important practical consideration and one that
merits the serious concern of the legal profession.
Considerations Regarding the Canons of Professional Ethics
The ethical questions center chiefly around three issues, reflected in
Canons 31, 35, and 47 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Ameri-
58. See Land Title Abstract Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 30-32, 193 N.E. 650,
653 (1934), citing with approval In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15
(1910).
59. See In the Matter of the Florida Bar, Petitioner, No. 31073 (Sup. Cr., Oct. 11, 1961)
cited in 35 FIA. B.J. 1067 (1961). See Jones, The Professional Corporationt, 27 FOR HAM
L. REV. 353, 362 (1958). But see In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E.
725 (1935), indicating that under no circumstances may a corporation practice law.
In its recent decision in State ex. rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114 (1962), the
supreme court denied the petitions in mandamus to require the Secretary of State to accept
for filing articles of incorporation of professional associations formed to engage in the practice
of law on the ground that Rule XIV of its Rules of Practice, adopted by the court under its
inherent power to prescribe standards for the admission to the practice of law, did not permit
practice by "any other than natural persons." The court did not, however, hold that a pro-
fessional association, by its very nature, is precluded from carrying on the practice of law. It
based its decision instead on the requirements of its existing rules of practice.
Several local bar associations in the State of Ohio filed briefs in the case. The general
argument of these briefs was that the petitions for mandamus should be denied because of
defects in the proposed articles of incorporation, but that no final decision should be made as
to the inherent right of professional associations of lawyers to practice law until the organized
bar of Ohio has had an opportunity to be heard by the Supreme Court. Presumably, the Su-
preme Court will now take under advisement the question of whether its Rules of Practice
should be amended to permit professional associations to practice law.
60. Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law - A Study in Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 MD. L.
REV. 342, 345 (1938).
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can Bar Association. Briefly stated, these are: (1) the professional asso-
ciation would be an intermediary between the attorney and his client, and
his primary responsibility would be to the association, in violation of
Canon 35, (2) the professional association would be an unauthorized
lay agency using the attorney's services in violation of Canon 47, and (3)
the direct responsibility of the attorney for litigation and for selection of
clients would be eliminated, in violation of Canon 31. Doubtlessly
other ethical considerations could be raised, or the above three stated
differently, but they are the ones of prime importance. Any professional
association could practice in such a way as to violate all of them, but the
corporate form of organization does not inherently violate any of them.6
It seems reasonably clear that a professional association of attorneys
under the Ohio law would not be a "lay agency" within the meaning of
Canon 35. It seems equally clear that the individual attorney will per-
form services for, and as an agent of, the professional association. In
this sense the association will be an intermediary between the individual
attorney and his client. In fact it is essential that this relationship exist,
else the tax benefits realizable by reason of the attorney's status as an em-
ployee will be unavailable.6" The professional association and its attor-
neys could, by subordinating the interest of their clients to the interests of
the association, carry on the practice of law in violation of Canon 35."
Nothing in the form of the organization requires that it do so.
One aspect of the professional association that is of legitimate con-
cern is that as a matter of corporate law all of the authority of the cor-
61. The Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association
recently has issued Opinion 303, holding that the carrying on of the practice of law in the
form of a professional association or professional corporation does not of itself constitute a
violation of professional ethics, the substance of the arrangement, not the form, being the con-
trolling consideration. The Opinion indicates that some members of the Committee entertain
grave doubts as to the wisdom of practicing law through such a corporate vehicle, but
find nothing inherently unethical in the use of this legal form. The Supreme Court of the
State of Florida (See In the Matter of the Florida Bar, Petitioner, No. 3173 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 11,
1961) note 59 supra) has amended its Integration Rule and its Code of Ethics to permit the
practice of law by corporations organized under the Florida law. The Board of Governors of
the Colorado Bar Association on October 11, 1961 adopted a resolution recommending the
adoption by the Supreme Court of Colorado of a rule permitting lawyers to incorporate.
62. Rev. Proc. 61-11, 1961-1 CuM. BULL 897.
63. See the oft quoted language from In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483-84, 92
N.E. 15, 16 (1910), which refers to a corporation conducted wholly by laymen, with no
lawyer among its stockholders, directors, or officers: "The relation of attorney and client is
that of master and servant in a limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust
and confidence. It cannot be delegated without consent and it cannot exist between an at-
torney employed by a corporation to practice law for it, and a client of the corporation, for he
would be subject to the directions of the corporation and not to the directions of the client.
There would be neither contract nor privity between him and the client, and he would not
owe even the duty of counsel to the actual litigant. The corporation would control the litiga-
tion, the money earned would belong to the corporation and the attorney would be responsible
to the corporation only. His master would not be the client but the corporation, conducted
it may be wholly by laymen, organized simply to make money and not to aid in the administra-
tion of justice which is the highest function of an attorney and counselor at law."
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poration is exercisable by the directors. They have specific authority to
select officers, to determine their authority and duties,64 and to fix their
compensation. 5 This centralization of management is, of course, one of
the corporate attributes which the professional association law is intended
to provide. In a broad sense, then, the attorney's work is subject to the
direction of another. If the directors are lawyers active in the practice
of the professional association, however, there should be no violation of
professional ethics.6 But if this kind of control over a lawyer's work
raises ethical problems, then, as has been well pointed out,6" these same
ethical concerns may exist today for law partnerships which employ non-
partner lawyers.
QUALIFICATION AS A CORPORATION FOR TAx PURPOSES
The professional association will be useful only if it will qualify as a
corporation for tax purposes by satisfying the conditions required by the
Treasury Regulations for classification as an "association." There is also
an argument made that the professional association could qualify for tax
purposes by reason of being classified as a "corporation" under state law
and, therefore, not subject to the tests imposed by the Regulations.6" This
position apparently assumes that the incorporation by reference of the
provisions of the general corporation laws of the various states in their
professional association or professional corporation laws removes the pro-
fessional organization from the scope of the Regulations. Presumably
this argument would not be available to professional associations or-
ganized under laws of the kind passed by Pennsylvania and Illinois,
which identify the organization as a professional association and do not
make any reference to the corporation law.
The position is doubtful in view of the statutory provisions applicable
to professional corporations, the express purpose of which is to modify
to some extent the usual attributes of the ordinary business corporation
in order to meet professional standards. In the event of any conflict, the
provisions of the professional corporation law control.6" Obviously there
are sound reasons, in such circumstances, for applying a uniform standard
in determining whether the professional corporation has sufficient sig-
nificant corporate attributes to warrant classification as a corporation for
64. OHio REv. CODE § 1701.64 (Supp. 1961).
65. Omo REv. CODE § 1701.60 (Supp. 1961).
66. Opinion 303, Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar
Association.
67. Porter, et al., Report of the Special Committee of the Section of Taxation of the American
Bar Association to Cooperate with the Committee on Professional Ethics re Association of
Attorneys Taxable as Corporations (July 17, 1961).
68. See Alexander, Some Tax Problems of a Professional Association, pp. 232-33 infra.
69. OHIO REV. CODE § 1785.08 (Supp. 1961).
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tax purposes." Applicability of the appropriate standard should not be
governed by the name which the state law chooses to give to the profes-
sional organization7' Apparently the Internal Revenue Service will not
consider the terminology of the particular professional corporation law
to be controlling,72 or even significant, and will apply to corporations
formed under these laws the same tests which it applies to associations
and other unincorporated organizations.
The two basic characterstics provided in the Regulations" as being
common to all corporations are (1) the presence of associates and
(2) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom.
Under the Ohio Professional Association Law the shareholders would be
the "associates." Except for a professional association organized by one
individual and having only one shareholder, the professional association
should satisfy these two basic requirements. 4 The one-man professional
association would lack "associates" because there would be no one, other
than the sole shareholder, who would participate in the business in order
to divide the gains therefrom. 5
The remaining four significant corporate characteristics under the
Regulations are (1) continuity of life, (2) centralization of manage-
ment, (3) limited liability, and (4) free transferability of interests. The
first condition is met under the Ohio law. The organization will not be
dissolved by reason of the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resig-
nation, or expulsion of any shareholder.76 Dissolution can be effected
70. It does not follow that the requirements of the Regulations represent the proper standard.
See Note, Qualified Pension. Plans for Unincorporated Professional Associations, 12 STAN.
L REV. 746, 758 (1960), suggesting that continuity of existence and centralized management
are the most vital elements and pointing out that restrictions upon the transfer of corporate
stock are both lawful and common in closely held corporations and that limitation of personal
liability, while a typical corporate attribute, has been held not an essential corporate character-
istic.
71. See Bittker, Professional Associations and Pederal Income Taxation: Some Comments
and Questions, 17 TAx L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1961).
72. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b), (c) (1960).
73. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1960).
74. It is possible that if the income were allocated among the shareholders under a method
which, in substance, would treat each shareholder as an independent contractor earning his
own fees, the business would not be conducted for "joint profit" within the meaning of Regu-
lation section 301.7701-2 (a) (2) (1960).
75. Note, Qualified Pension Plans for Unincorporated Professional Associations, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 746, 756 (1960). Should a one-man professional corporation somehow qualify,
notwithstanding the absence of associates, the Treasury may nevertheless assert that for tax
purposes the corporate entity is to be disregarded. See Jones, The Professional Corporation,
27 FORDHAM L. REv. 353, 371 (1958).
76. The Ohio law does not provide what the consequences are, if any, if the enumerated
events occur and if the shares of the person in question are not transferred to a professionally
qualified person or redeemed by the professional association. The view has been expressed
that under a similar professional association law the consequences could be the termination
of the life of the professional organization. See Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal
Income Taxation: Some Comments and Questions, 17 TAx L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1961), dis-
cussing section 11 of the Georgia Act (GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4301-4318) which specifically
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only by following the established dissolution procedures under the cor-
poration law.
Satisfaction of the third condition also seems reasonably certain. The
shareholders will not, by reason of their status as shareholders, have any
personal liability for debts of or claims against the association.7"
The other two significant corporate characteristics, (2) centralization
of management and (4) free transferability of interests, can be satisfied
by a professional association formed under the Ohio law."8 There are,
however, practical considerations affecting all professions which will per-
mit the fourth characteristic to exist, if at all, only in a modified form.
The centralization of management requirement relates to the au-
thority to make the management decisions of the professional association.
The Regulations do not specify what is encompassed by the term "man-
agement decisions." The statement in the Regulations that the persons
having this authority "resemble in power and functions the directors of a
statutory corporation 79 would indicate that this test does not require
direct, day to day supervision of the work of the professional corporation.8"
Satisfaction of this condition, therefore, would not seem to require control
of a kind which would conflict with the professional responsibility of
the employees performing professional services in behalf of the profes-
sional corporation.
Under the Ohio law the professional association, as does any corpora-
tion, has centralization of management in form through its board of
directors.8 ' One ordinarily would consider this sufficient to satisfy this
test. The Regulations, however, expressly provide that the group which
has continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions
must not include all the members,82 thus making this a substantive test
of sorts. As applied to an Ohio professional association this would mean
provides for dissolution of the professional association in the event a disqualified associate
fails to sever all interest in the professional association. Although there are gaps in the Ohio
law in treating the problem of disqualified and deceased shareholders, it can not be assumed
that the consequence is dissolution of the professional association.
77. See p. 203 supra. See also note 49 supra and accompanying text.
78. The statutory provision restricting transferees of shares to professionally qualified indi-
viduals (OHIO REv. CODE § 1785.07) does not violate the free transferability of interest test.
See Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), Example (1) (1960).
79. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (1960).
80. Note, Qualified Pension Plans for Unincorporated Professional Associations, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 746, 760 (1960): "It is clear that the people responsible for the everyday work
of the corporation make many management decisions potentially binding the corporation. In
fact, the function of the board of directors of a corporation is essentially to guide the direction
of the corporation... "
81. The Internal Revenue Service may assert that the provisions of law preserving the pro-
fessional relationship between the person performing and the person receiving professional
service overrides the provision of the Ohio general corporation law vesting management of the
corporation in its directors. See Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxa-
tion: Some Comments and Questions, 17 TAX L. Rrv. 1, 10-13 (1961).
82. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (1960).
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that all of the shareholders may not be directors of the corporation.
Literal compliance with this provision would require that a professional
association having three or less shareholders have at least one non-share-
holder as a director. A director who is not professionally licensed clearly
would be unacceptable in some professions, such as law, medicine, ac-
counting, and perhaps in all professions. The use of professionally quali-
fied non-shareholder directors may offer a possible solution in the case
of some professions.
It also is possible that the Internal Revenue Service will do more than
merely count the number of shareholders and the number of shareholders
serving as directors in determining whether centralization of manage-
ment exists. If the non-director shareholders have only a small interest
in the organization, there is some reason to believe that the Service would
not consider this as meeting the centralization of management test.83
The free transferability of interests test of the Regulations, as a
practical matter, will be difficult to meet. Any restriction on the free
transferability of shares modifies this characteristic to some extent. The
Regulations recognize that a provision requiring that the shares be
offered to the other shareholders at their fair market value does not
destroy this characteristic, describing such an arrangement as "a modified
form" of free transferability of interests.8" But the customary form of
restrictive stock provisions usually involves a formula price, or some
other price, not stated in terms of market value, although it presumably
represents the parties' best estimate of a means for determining what the
stock will be worth in the future. Thus in view of the very restrictive
and technical view of the Internal Revenue Service reflected in the Regu-
lations, it may be expected that the Service will not look favorably on
restrictive stock provisions.85
To summarize, except for the special situation of the one-man corpora-
tion, or a two or three-man corporation in which all shareholders also are
directors, a professional association formed under the Ohio law should be
able to satisfy all the requirements of the Regulations, with the possible
exception of the free transferability of interests test. In many cases it
should be able to satisfy that requirement in a modified form. Accord-
ingly, it should qualify for treatment as a corporation for tax purposes
under the Treasury's Regulations.
83. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1960).
84. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960).
85. Porter, et al., Report of the Special Committee of the Section of Taxation of the American
Bar Association to Cooperate with the Committee on Professional Ethics re Association of
Attorneys Taxable as Corporations (July 17, 1961).
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Other Tax Requirements
Classification of the professional association as an association or cor-
poration for tax purposes will not provide the complete answer to the
tax problems of professional men in the area of retirement benefits. It
is only the first step. A further condition is that the professional em-
ployees qualify as "employees" of the professional association for tax pur-
poses.8 This will be determined by the overall relationship between the
professional employee and the professional association and will not de-
pend upon any narrow "control" test. It appears to be well settled, and
the Internal Revenue Service apparently recognizes, that the specialized
and technical nature of professional work means that the control of an
employer over the manner in which the professional employee conducts
the duties of his position necessarily must be more tenuous and general
than the control over non-professional employees.' A number of fac-
tors8 will be considered in determining whether the necessary relation-
ship exists.
Finally, the association's pension or profit-sharing plan must meet
the requirements for qualification under the Internal Revenue Code and
Treasury Regulations. These will be the same requirements applicable
to qualified plans generally.8 9 The factors of principal concern will be
the requirements that the plan benefit employees in general and that it
does not discriminate respecting contributions or benefits in favor of
officers, shareholders, or highly compensated employees. Profit-sharing
plans probably will be found to be best adapted to most professional
associations9 ° by permitting greater flexibility in determining annual con-
tributions and in avoiding a fixed annual obligation, factors of particular
importance to the smaller enterprise.
86. See Rev. Proc. 61-11, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 897, discussed in Alexander, Some Tax Prob-
lems of a Professional Association, pp. 225-27 infra. One might properly ask why this re-
quirement apparently is stressed by the Service in the case of professional associations since
it rarely, if ever, has been a factor in qualifying plans for smaller, closely held corporations.
87. Wendell E. James, 25 T.C. 1296 (1956); Rev. Rul. 61-178, 1961 INT. REv. BuLL. No.
41, at 8; Special Ruling dated March 2, 1961, relative to a medical corporation organized un-
der the laws of the State of Connecticut, reported in 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX. REp.
6375.
88. The factors enumerated in the Special Ruling (See note 87 supra.) are (1) the degree
to which such individual has become integrated into the operating organization of the em-
ployer; (2) the substantial nature, regularity, and continuity of his work for the employer,
(3) the authority vested in or reserved by the employer to require compliance with his general
standards and policies; and (4) the degree to which the individual under consideration has
been accorded the rights and privileges of other clearly recognized employees.
89. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, 1961 INT. REv. BULL. No. 35, at 8. The Internal Revenue
Service will not permit the past services of partners to be taken into account in satisfying
eligibility requirements and qualifying for prior service benefits. Rev. Proc. 61-11, 1961-1
GUM. BULL. 897. This could create a serious inequality between partners having a long
period of service and professional employees with relatively few years of service.
90. Opinion 303 of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American
Bar Association concludes that a profit sharing plan which includes lawyers and non-lawyers
would effect an unethical division of fees in violation of Canon 34.
